Two Problems With Regime Change Missions

Regime change

In a globalized world, policies implemented by one country have externalities that can affect the security, economy, and politics of other nations. When a government implements an unwanted policy, countries adversely affected by the policy may wish to see that government replaced with another that will implement a more favorable policy. Such a desired change is often the reason behind covert regime-change missions. The United States has conducted several regime-change campaigns throughout its history, including the CIA-engineered coup in Chile and the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan. But despite the rhetoric in Washington that a more democratic world is safer, scholars have found that regime-change operations rarely succeed as envisioned and almost always produce deleterious side effects.

The first problem is that most forcible regime-change missions overshoot their goals. They impose leaders on local populations who have very different preferences than their foreign patrons. Trying to please both groups alienates both and creates a wedge between the imposed leadership and its people. Examples abound from history, such as the US efforts to overthrow Patrice Lumumba’s government in Congo-Leopoldville and the more recent effort to unseat the socialist President Maduro in Venezuela.

This gap between desired goals and the ability to achieve them also forces the intervening power into lengthy nation-building projects that are unlikely to fulfill the original policy aims. The second problem is that most forcible regime-change campaigns ignore the need to build trust with local populations and other key stakeholders during the transition. This can lead to a lack of legitimacy for the new leadership, which in turn fosters instability and can empower factions that are as dangerous as—or even more dangerous than—the outgoing regime.