Regime change has been a popular policy tool for promoting democracy and human rights abroad. However, a growing scholarly consensus has emerged that these policies are often ineffective and have deleterious side effects, whether they are meant to achieve political, security, or humanitarian goals. This article examines the empirical evidence to show that regime-change strategies are unlikely to meet their stated objectives and that they can actually make things worse in the long run. Moreover, regime-change policies tend to undermine other tools that are more effective at achieving democratic and humanitarian goals.
Proponents of regime change argue that the regime in question does harm to its citizens in order to benefit itself and that, if given the opportunity, the people would elect a government that has their best interests at heart. These claims are flawed in several ways. First, the idea that a regime will automatically become more democratic once it has been ousted ignores the fact that, for democratization to take hold, certain conditions must be met. These conditions include a desire for democracy, the ability to form coalitions that can compete with one another for power, and the development of institutions that are capable of mediating conflicts between competing factions.
Furthermore, studies show that regime-change campaigns typically lead to a higher level of instability and repression than the incumbent government. This is because the ousted government is forced to deal with popular demands and to implement reforms, which often require substantial sacrifices from its population in order to be implemented.